民主制度为什么能稳定运转？下面这些 Readings 从不同角度探讨了这个问题。 ### 1. **Theoretical Foundations** - **Przeworski, Adam. (2005). *Democracy as an Equilibrium*. Public Choice, 123(3), 253-273.** - Przeworski explores the idea that democracy can be seen as a self-enforcing equilibrium, where all actors, including the government and opposition, have incentives to adhere to democratic rules because the costs of breaking them outweigh the benefits. - **Boix, Carles. (2003). *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.** - Boix offers a theoretical framework that explains how economic inequality and redistribution affect the sustainability of democratic institutions, arguing that democracy is more stable when wealth distribution is more equal. - **Acemoglu, Daron, & Robinson, James A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.** - This seminal work provides a theory on the transitions between democracy and autocracy, focusing on how elites and citizens bargain over political power and institutions in different economic conditions. - **Dahl, Robert A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press.** - Dahl's classic work on democratic governance addresses the conditions under which democratic institutions are stable, emphasizing the importance of political participation and opposition in maintaining a democratic balance. ### 2. **Empirical Studies and Historical Analyses** - **Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press.** - Huntington examines the patterns of democratization during the third wave (1974-1990s), focusing on why certain democracies endure while others revert to authoritarianism. - **Levitsky, Steven, & Ziblatt, Daniel. (2018). *How Democracies Die*. Crown Publishing Group.** - This book uses historical case studies to analyze the breakdown of democratic systems in the 20th and 21st centuries, highlighting the importance of norms and informal rules in maintaining democratic stability. - **Svolik, Milan. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press.** - Svolik provides a detailed analysis of how authoritarian regimes maintain power and explores the conditions under which these regimes transition to democracy or collapse. - **Linz, Juan J., & Stepan, Alfred. (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Johns Hopkins University Press.** - Linz and Stepan focus on the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation, offering a detailed comparative study of regions that have struggled with transitioning to stable democracies. - **Geddes, Barbara. (1999). *What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?* Annual Review of Political Science, 2, 115-144.** - This review article synthesizes two decades of research on democratization, focusing on the factors that influence the stability and endurance of new democracies. ### 3. **Game Theory and Self-Enforcing Equilibria** - **Weingast, Barry R. (1997). *The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law*. American Political Science Review, 91(2), 245-263.** - Weingast's influential paper argues that democracy is self-enforcing when citizens are capable of coordinating to resist government overreach, thus creating a balance of power that sustains democratic rules. - **Fearon, James D. (2011). *Self-Enforcing Democracy*. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6(1), 5-43.** - Fearon presents a formal model that explains how democratic institutions can be self-enforcing when political actors perceive that adhering to democratic rules provides better long-term payoffs than violating them. - **Acemoglu, Daron, & Robinson, James A. (2001). *A Theory of Political Transitions*. American Economic Review, 91(4), 938-963.** - This paper develops a game-theoretic model of political transitions, focusing on how different economic structures and power dynamics influence the durability of democratic systems. - **Myerson, Roger B. (2008). *The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State*. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 125-139.** - Myerson analyzes how autocratic leaders can credibly commit to democratic transitions and how such transitions become self-enforcing through institutional mechanisms and the distribution of power. ### 4. **Economic Perspectives and Political Economy** - **North, Douglass C., Wallis, John J., & Weingast, Barry R. (2009). *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge University Press.** - This book explores how different social orders, including democracies, manage violence and enforce rules, providing a framework for understanding the stability of democratic institutions in comparison to autocracies. - **Acemoglu, Daron, & Robinson, James A. (2012). *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. Crown Business.** - Acemoglu and Robinson discuss how inclusive economic and political institutions underpin stable democracies, contrasting this with extractive institutions that lead to autocracy and instability. - **Boix, Carles, & Stokes, Susan C. (2003). *Endogenous Democratization*. World Politics, 55(4), 517-549.** - This paper examines the endogenous factors—such as wealth, income distribution, and education—that influence the emergence and sustainability of democratic systems. - **Haggard, Stephan, & Kaufman, Robert R. (2016). *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. Princeton University Press.** - Haggard and Kaufman analyze how mass movements, elite bargaining, and economic conditions shape the processes of democratic transitions and stability. ### 5. **Institutional Design Perspectives** - **Przeworski, A., Stokes, S. C., & Manin, B. (1999). *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.** - This book explores the mechanisms of accountability in democratic systems, analyzing how electoral processes and institutional designs help ensure that governments respect limits on their power. - **Elster, J. (1995). *Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process*. Duke Law Journal, 45(2), 364-396.** - Elster examines how constitutions are crafted to set limits on governmental power and protect against authoritarianism, emphasizing the role of institutional design. - **Schedler, A. (1999). *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.** - This book looks at how new democracies establish mechanisms of self-restraint, focusing on the challenges and processes that ensure the government respects democratic norms and limitations. ### 6. **Critical Perspectives and Challenges to Democratic Stability** - **Diamond, Larry. (2015). *Facing Up to the Democratic Recession*. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141-155.** - Diamond discusses the global trend of democratic backsliding and explores the factors that contribute to the weakening of democratic institutions in both established and new democracies. - **Levitsky, Steven, & Way, Lucan A. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press.** - The authors investigate regimes that blend democratic and authoritarian elements, exploring how these hybrid regimes can maintain stability without fully transitioning to democracy. - **Schedler, Andreas. (2002). *The Menu of Manipulation*. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 36-50.** - Schedler examines how electoral manipulation and other non-democratic practices can undermine democratic institutions from within, offering insights into how fragile democracies may persist without being fully democratic. ### 7. **Case Studies and Regional Analyses** - **Bratton, Michael, & Van de Walle, Nicolas. (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.** - This book explores the dynamics of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on the challenges to democratic stability in the context of economic crises and institutional weaknesses. - **Carothers, Thomas. (2002). *The End of the Transition Paradigm*. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5-21.** - Carothers critiques the assumptions behind the "transition paradigm" and offers a more nuanced view of democratic stability, emphasizing the importance of local context and non-linear paths of political development. ### Supplementary Reading - **Robert D. Putnam. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press.** - Putnam’s core argument is that the effectiveness and stability of democratic institutions depend heavily on the presence of social capital—networks of civic engagement, norms of reciprocity, and trust within society.